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Introduction: 
 
I hope to summarize 20-years of collaborative research projects with Syrian and North 
American Muslim women who self-identify with the Qur’anic gender revolution. In this 
work, I am emphasizing trends affecting (1) the structure of domestic life including 
conflicts between market democracy and current interpretations of Islamic individual 
liberty, (2) declines in social and political self-governance, and (3) the gradual erasure of 
mutual consultation, or Shura, as an intellectual project.  
 
What is at stake here? 
If one goal of bridging Islamic and Western perceptions of democracy is social and 
political justice, another goal would be to create an approach to knowledge generation, 
wherein both women and men define transformation for a more just, participatory society 
respectful of individual autonomy, as well as of divine, civic, and natural laws. To 
achieve these goals, Muslim women need direct access and conscientious knowledge of 
Islam and the law of the land, as well as autonomous action void of the intermediary of 
institutionalized paradigms. Be they the paradigms of authoritative or hegemonic 
governments guarding the “values” of tribal or conservative right-wing, or the Ulema or 
Orientalists guarding the old, prevailing interpretations of Islamic heritage, all must be   2
secondary to the Muslim woman’s self-identification with Islam as a worldview. Thus, the 
only solution is to re-examine and re-interpret the Islamic texts, primarily the Qur’an.  
 
Why and How? 
The need to re-interpret the Qur’an becomes obvious when we realize that centuries-old 
reform attempts brought only temporary and partial solutions. By either emphasizing or 
neglecting the religious, both so-called “Islamists” and “secularists” created more 
problems rather than solving the existing ones. I will narrate some of these solutions, 
analyze them in the context of the different meanings of democracy, and compare them 
with empirical results from the two grassroots Muslim women groups in Syria and North 
America who are re-interpreting the Qur’an.  I conclude with implications for self-
identity and self-determination. 
 
Drawing an analogy between active participation within the Qur`anic concepts of 
Tawhid, trusteeship, and justice vis-à-vis the majority-minority and electoral democracy 
as practiced in the West, I address the tensions between Western generated conceptions 
of democracy vis-à-vis self-identified Muslim women’s agency. These tensions are 
manifested on four levels: (1) value claims - the ontological, (2) knowledge claims- the 
epistemological, (3) cultural or historical claims, and (4) praxis or socialization claims, 
which I collectively call “worldview claims.” My focus will, therefore, be on the relation 
between the power of knowledge and social and political constructs. 
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A Muslim who consciously chooses the Islamic worldview as a reference, cannot fully 
identify with Islamic goals unless she frees the ideal from the hidden discourses and 
worldviews of those who believe in the social construction of gender and the Islamicity 
of equal but separate.  Moving, instead, into the view of human moral and cognitive 
autonomy will shed new light on understanding the Muslim woman and her self-
liberation by means of the interactive rationality of Islam.  
 
 
To achieve transformation in democratic theory and practice, we must go beyond reform, 
or retrofitting—fixing a faulty structure with new parts not available at the time of 
construction. Going beyond retrofitting means not simply incorporating ‘new’ ideas into 
existing theories and democratic practice, but fundamentally changing the very practices 
and theories themselves. In discussing the pedagogy of Islamic democracy, I argue 
against a retrofitted democratization that sets up parallel historical tracks of different 
groups, leaving intact a fundamentally pseudo, weak Euro-American-centered 
democratization structure.  Instead, I advocate re-examining existing heritage and re-
writing the new interpretation to integrate the constituent groups’ histories and 
conversations.  In other words, theory and practice of Islamic democracy are not only 
means for achieving social and political justice. They are the goal of transformation for 
theory, practice, and the new world policy-making process.  
 
II. Temporary, Partial Solutions vs. Self-identification 
 
To elaborate, Montgomery Watt wrote: For the Occidental, there are grave difficulties in 
attaining a balanced understanding of the historical role of Muhammad. The most serious   4
of these is that the dominant conception of religion as a private and individual matter 
leads Occidentals to expect that a religious leader will be a certain kind of man; and it is 
disconcerting to find that Muhammad does not conform to this expectation. For 
Muhammad, religion was the total response of his personality to the total situation in 
which he found himself. (“Muhammad.” in the Cambridge History of Islam, Volume I, 1970: 30) 
 
Watt’s description of the Prophet of Islam also represents the relation of the political to 
the religious and the intellectual in Muslim thought and governance. When, at his 
deathbed, Muhammad chose Abu Bakr, his companion, to lead the collective prayer, 
Muslims ignored the dynamics of the Qur’an that instates all humans as trustees and 
interpreted this choice as favoring male over female in political and religious leadership. 
They did not realize that the Prophet’s choice between Abu Bakr and Abu Bakr’s 
daughter, A’isha, who was also the Prophet’s wife and intellectual authority of Islam, was 
merely in response to the social and political situation in contemporary Makkah.  
Such misinterpretations continue to haunt Muslims, to the point of separating the political 
and the religious from the intellectual in interpreting the governing principle of mutual 
consultation. As this latter principle applies to both domestic and community relations, by 
limiting the consultative power to males in communal leadership, Muslims created 
another rift within, and between the domestic and the communal.  I submit that this 
misinterpretation still dominates Muslims’ behavior, resulting in partial solutions to 
domestic issues and inviting the interference of Occidentals and Western government 
bureaucrats who think that democratization of the Muslim world is the one that separates 
the religious and the secular.  For example, 
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in October 2001 President Bush notified Congress of US military 
campaign in Afghanistan. In November, 2001, in her Radio Address 
to the Nation, First Lady Laura Bush stated: “Because of our recent 
military gains in much of Afghanistan, women are no longer 
imprisoned in their homes. The fight against terrorism is also a fight 
for the rights and dignity of women.”  
(Retrieved, 4/27/ 2003 from: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011117.html).   
Despite this claimed liberation, in November 2, 2002, Reuters reported that 
The Afghan Supreme Court has dismissed a female judge, Marzeya Basil, 
for not wearing an Islamic headscarf during a meeting with President Bush 
and his wife in October 2002. 
 
Another example, as a result of the harassment that some Muslim women 
encountered after September 2001, The American Muslim Women League 
asked a male Imam if it is acceptable for women to remove their head-cover 
under such extreme conditions (MWL newsletter, 2001), which degrading because 
it suggests that a woman needs permission from males to wear or remove a 
piece of cloth. It is also perplexing because the Muslim Women League 
itself was in the late 1990’s leading a US delegation to investigate and 
defend human rights of Bosnian women. 
 
 
 
Whether they are interpreting the Qur’an or the ideals of Western democracy, the 
underlying assumption of the above solutions remains that women have proxy morality, 
and still being treated as a minority group and as secondary to men in the religious, 
intellectual, social and political structures. Some of the above instances also show how 
the American experiment in democracy has not been able to protect its own citizens from 
discrimination and, to the contrary, has retracted back in times of crisis to oppressing 
minority groups, exactly as Alexis de Tocqueville feared would happen (Democracy in 
America. Indianapolis, Ind.: Hackett Pub, 2000). Lately, the ruling majority bureaucrats have 
even shown the desire to “liberate Islam” itself.   6
Although I like this idea of liberating Islam from its current interpreters, be they Orientals 
or Occidentals, one question still begs the answer: “Who has the authority to re-interpret 
Islam?” 
 
Islam, as Deen (worldview), is basically textual, not based on an event (as for example, 
with Christ’s resurrection in Christianity), or on a law (as with the law of the Torah in 
Judaism). The content of the text, i.e., the Qur’an is what defines all Islamic beliefs, from 
the divine authorship to the relation of God with humanity. The Qur’an itself reminds us 
that it is not because of the Prophet Muhammad that Muslims accept the Qur`an, but it is 
because of the Qur’an that they accept the authority of the Prophet.  What happened is 
that Muslims have, to a large extent, reversed the order when, as present in other major 
religions of the time, idealized the Prophet, his male companions, and his reported 
extrapolation on the Qur`an, his Sunnah.  Most contemporary Muslims even forget that 
the Prophet’s extrapolation (resulting in external text to the Qur’an, i.e., the Hadith) does 
not supersede the Qur`anic text.  Therefore, it is not merely the participation of women in 
the reading and the interpretation of the text that is of issue here, but it is their self-
identification with Islam as the Deen of Tawhid that is of utmost concern.  Tawhid means 
that the authority lies only with God, whose guidance is in the text of the Qur`an, and 
hence, each individual Muslim has the right and the responsibility of interpreting the 
Qur’an.  
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III.  Meanings of Democracy 
The first verse of Chapter four in the Qur’an sets the framework for the Islamic gender 
revolution in the intellectual, social and political structures; wherein the woman is viewed 
as the core of human well-being, where human conscientious agency determines liberty, 
and where human rights are achieved by one’s rational, constructive efforts, or Taqwa. 
 
 
Contrary to the Qur’anic principles stand the argument of Orientalists, such as Bernard 
Lewis to reform, liberate, or democratize Islam through changes in the status of women 
after the Western model. (What Went Wrong Western impact and middle eastern response [video 
recording] West Lafayette, IN : C-SPAN Archives 2001)  First, Lewis seems to apply his 
understanding of the Hebrew meaning of ‘Herut,’ (freedom, meaning submission to the 
law) to the understanding of the meaning of free will in Islam.  In Islam, however, the 
order is exactly the opposite. Free will is a pre-requisite to accepting, understanding, and 
employing the moral guidance of the message of the Qur’an, and this acceptance 
becomes legal and binding only after the individual makes the conscious choice to accept 
or reject the message, not because it represents the law. Second, Western discourses, 
particularly feminism that relies on the politics of difference as in the case in the nation-
state civic democracy, often dismiss Muslim women’s self-identity as “religious”. Third, 
as we saw above, despite minor changes, the attitudes of the majority traditional male 
Ulamas and policy-makers have not changed. They still consider preserving customary 
traditions tantamount to preserving the Qur’an or the constitution. This is why some 
Muslim women, including some of my collaborators, resist the feminist- and the nation-
state-informed democracy, as well as Muslim male elite conception and practice of the   8
consultative process (shura)—wherein participation is limited to the selected few, and 
women’s participation is an “add-on” or only to address “women” issues. 
 
 
IV. Empirical Research Results  
The way out, therefore, is by allowing space for Muslim women to assert their moral 
autonomy and to participate in the re-interpretation of both the Qur’anic guidelines and 
other legislations. My evidence lies in the findings with Syrian and American Muslim 
women reclaiming their primary self-identity with Islam through deeper understanding of 
the Qur’an, but with different transformation processes. The Americans were relying 
mainly on scholarship, while the Syrians began with grassroots activism moving toward 
scholarship. I present only the main findings and their implications for national and 
international relations.  
 
The pedagogical assumption--that once a woman changes what is in herself she will be 
able to work with others to question and change social and political structures (Qur’an, 
13:11)--gave different results for the two groups. While it was confirmed among the Syrian 
group, it was not confirmed with the American.  I believe that the latter group overlooked 
the power of the largely unquestioned Western approach of separating theory and practice 
which results not only in the marginalization of the worldview of Muslim women, but 
also viewed them as the “oppressed dependent other” who needed to be given the road 
map to salvation by the White Western male. 
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While the Syrian group realized early on that a Muslim may not fulfill the Islamic 
pedagogy of a trustee without being able to autonomously choose, understand, and act on 
her choice of Islam as a worldview, the American group were slow at realizing such 
autonomy. The request from a male Imam to have a decree for women’s removal of head-
cover is only one example.  Despite living under a one-party government, the Syrian 
group has reached a level of self-learning and self-governing that could represent a form 
of participatory democratization because it affirms Muslim woman's agency. It is the 
ability to authenticate one’s own knowledge, and not someone’s imposed knowledge and 
views, that drives the individual to act towards a progressive egalitarian attitude! 
 
V. Conclusions 
Non-Muslims, particularly feminists and policy-makers, need to become more aware of 
Muslim women’s worldview and not only look at them through the veil issues, the 
politics of difference, or corporate globalization. Muslim women scholar-activists also 
need to unveil their conscious process in order to make their worldview claims 
accessible. 
  
The first pre-requisite to Muslim woman’s identification with Islam--as a moral choice--
is her participation in reading and interpreting the text of the Qur`an (Barazangi, 2000). 
The second pre-requisite is that Muslim women’s self-identity must be acknowledged by 
both Muslims and non-Muslims before one can expect those women to be agents of 
change instead of receivers of change. Thirdly, Muslim women need to formulate their 
own choice before one can claim that a free identification with Islam is actualized   10
(Barazangi, 1997: 44). Fourthly, Muslim women must actualize the pedagogical dynamics of 
the Qur’an. That is, their involvement (or lack thereof) in formulating policies within 
Muslim communities and societies, as well as between them and other societies, will be 
the measuring stick in validating both the dynamics of the Qur`an and the success of its 
gender revolution. Despite their faith in Islam, and historical achievement, Muslims of 
different ages and regions have not been able to modify their prior conception of 
woman’s proxy morality, nor of her so-called complementary role to that of the man. 
That is the very reason why contemporary Muslims and those who study Muslims, 
despite the many so-called reform movements, are still confused as to what went wrong 
in Islamic history. Until these changes are made from within, the West’s view of, and 
behavior toward the Muslim people will not change. 